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ABSTRACT
In  his  classic  1957  study  of  hybrid  corn,  Griliches  emphasized  the  importance  of  economic
incentives and profitability in the adoption of new technology, and this focus has been continued in
the economics literature. But there is a distinct literature with roots in sociology emphasizing the
structure of organizations, informal networks, and ““change agents.”” We return to a forty-year-old
debate between Griliches and the sociologists by considering state-level factors associated with the
adoption of a variety of technological innovations: hybrid corn and tractors in the first half of the
20th century, computers in the 1990s, and the treatment of heart attacks during the last decade. First,
we find that some states consistently adopted new effective technology, whether hybrid corn,
tractors, or effective treatments for heart attacks such as Beta Blockers. Second, the adoption of these
new highly effective technologies was closely associated with social capital and state-level 1928 high
school graduation rates, but not per capita income, density, or (in the case of Beta Blockers)
expenditures on heart attack patients. Economic models are useful in identifying why some regions
are more likely to adopt early, but sociological barriers  ￿ perhaps related to a lack of social capital
















The idea that differential adoption of new technology can explain productivity 
differences across regions has gained acceptance in the economics literature.  Most of the 
variation in income per capita across countries appears to come from differences in total 
factor productivity (TFP) rather than differences in inputs such as capital or labor 
(Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Casselli and Coleman, 2000), and income 
differences have been directly related to differences across countries in technology 
adoption (Comin and Hobijn, 2004).  Economic models such as that proposed by Parente 
and Prescott (1994) imply that relatively small differences across countries in barriers to 
technology adoption could explain much of the difference in income levels and growth 
across countries.  In medicine, the recent emphasis on accountability has documented a 
similarly wide variation in medical practice with most observers agreeing that 
improvements in compliance with well-established guidelines could lead to substantial 
improvements in health outcomes of lagging regions (Berwick, 2003; Jencks, 2003; 
Skinner, 2003). 
The real question is why some countries or regions are successful in adopting 
efficient technological innovations, and why others lag behind?  The classic research in 
economics goes back to the study of state-level hybrid corn diffusion during the 1930s 
and 1940s by Zvi Griliches (Griliches, 1957).  For Griliches, the answer was clear: the 
presence of differential economic incentives and the profitability of innovation   2 
determined the wide variations in the pace of diffusion.
1 However, this view of the 
diffusion of technology was not shared universally.  During the early 1960s, there was a 
long and contentious debate between Griliches and sociologists in Rural Sociology on 
what caused technology to diffuse.  In this exchange, the sociologists, including Everett 
Rogers, emphasized characteristics of individual decision makers, the structure of 
networks, and interactions among decision makers in regulating the speed and extent of 
diffusion.
2  While Griliches ultimately acknowledged the potential importance of these 
sociological factors (Griliches, 1962), the literature on diffusion in sociology and the 
parallel literature in economics has shown little cross-fertilization, at least until quite 
recently.
3    
In this paper, we return to the debate between Griliches and the sociologists by 
considering a number of technological innovations in addition to hybrid corn, with a 
particular focus on the treatment of heart attacks (acute myocardial infarction or AMI) in 
the 1990s.   Between 1984 and 1998 mortality among the elderly in the year following a 
heart attack fell from 41 percent to 32 percent, with most of the gain representing 
progress in medical technology (Cutler, 2004; Cutler and McClellan, 2001). Despite these 
gains, there remain large and persistent differences across regions in the survival rates of 
observationally identical heart attack patients, differences that cannot be explained by 
variations in expenditures or surgical rates of diffusion (Skinner and Staiger, 2005; 
Skinner, Staiger, and Fisher, 2005).  These patterns suggest that, like hybrid corn, the 
                                                 
1  Hall (2004) provides an excellent synthesis of both the economic and sociological 
literature on diffusion.      
 
2   Brandner and Straus (1959), Griliches (1960), Havens and Rogers, (1961),  Griliches 
(1962), Rogers and Havens (1962), and Babcock (1962). 
 
3  See for example Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) and Conley and Udry (2004).    3 
diffusion of new innovations in the treatment of heart attacks has been uneven, with some 
regions lagging behind others.    
In a previous study, we found that early adopter states of hybrid corn in the 1930s 
and 1940s were also the early adopter states of ￿ Blockers for the treatment of heart 
attacks in 2000/01 (Skinner and Staiger, 2005).  ￿ Blockers are a highly effective and 
inexpensive off-patent drug used among appropriate AMI patients to reduce demands on 
a weakened heart.  Clinical trials indicate the use of ￿ Blockers reduce mortality by 25 
percent or more (Gottlieb, McCarter, and Vogel, 1998; Yusuf, Wittes, and Friedman, 
1998) and their beneficial effects have been well understood for several decades (Yusuf 
et. al., 1985).  In this paper, we expand our set of technological innovations to include not 
just hybrid corn and ￿ Blockers, but also tractors in the first half of the 20
th century, 
computers in the 1980s and early 1990s, and more general measures of technological 
progress in health care: changes and levels in one-year mortality and one-year 
expenditures for AMI patients during 1989-2001. Briefly, we find a strong state-level 
association in the likelihood to innovate in all technologies, ranging from tractors to ￿ 
Blockers.   
We next use a factor analysis approach to ask what characteristics of the state are 
most strongly associated with technological innovation in general, and which are most 
closely associated with higher costs for treating heart attacks?   Conventional economic 
explanatory variables include per capita income and population density to reflect 
potential geographic spillovers.  As well, we also include high school attainment in 1928 
(Goldin and Katz, 1998) and a measure that reflects social networks or social capital 
more generally (Putnam, 2001), a mechanism stressed in the early work on the diffusion   4 
of medical technology (Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966).  Nearly all of the variables 
considered in the analysis line up along two latent factors.  The first latent factor is highly 
associated with education (correlation 0.95) and the Putnam social capital index 
(correlation 0.97).  This first factor is also closely associated with the adoption of hybrid 
corn, tractors, ￿ Blockers, and both the level and decline in AMI mortality, with 
somewhat weaker correlation for computer ownership, but is not associated with 
increased costs for the treatment of heart attacks.  The second latent factor is strongly 
associated with per capita income (correlation 0.84) and population density (correlation 
0.89) in the state.  While this second factor is largely unrelated to technological diffusion 
or quality of health care, it is closely associated with higher health care costs (correlation 
0.92).   
In sum, there appear to be common factors or barriers within regions governing 
the adoption of cost-effective technology, whether corn, tractors, computers, or ￿ 
Blockers, and these are associated with the presence of education (or more effective 
social or informational networks) in the region.  Yet the adoption of these effective 
technologies was not associated with either per capita income, or money spent treating 
heart attack patients.  While Griliches (1957) developed powerful economic approaches 
to predict early technology adoption, sociological or network models may hold greater 
promise in explaining why some regions seem to lag so far behind.      
2.  Griliches Versus the Sociologists on Technological Diffusion 
Griliches (1957) hypothesized that farmers who stand to gain greater profits from 
an increase in productivity (per acre) would be more likely to adopt the use of hybrid 
corn, a type of corn that increased yield by about 20 percent.  Noting that the dollar value   5 
of investing in hybrid corn was larger for agricultural land that was already more 
productive prior to adoption, he estimated a strong and significant state-level (and crop 
reporting area) association between adoption and the initial value of agricultural land (see 
also Dixon, 1980 who found similar results).  Griliches acknowledged the potential 
importance of sociological factors in affecting diffusion, but dismissed them as relatively 
unimportant: 
It is my belief that in the long run, and cross-sectionally, these 
[sociological] variables tend to cancel themselves out, leaving the 
economic variables as the major determinants of the pattern of 
technological change.  This does not imply that the “sociological” 
variables are not important if one wants to know which individual will be 
the first or last to adopt a particular technique, only that these factors do 
not vary widely cross-sectionally [p. 522, footnote 45] 
 
Sociologists were not entirely pleased with this assessment of their work.  They 
attempted to challenge the Griliches results on statistical grounds by focusing on time-
series rather than cross-sectional analysis, but this approach was not entirely successful, 
since by appropriate correction for inflation Griliches (1962) reversed their result to one 
supporting his profitability hypothesis.  More successful was their study showing that 
hybrid sorghum tended to be adopted not so much where adoption was more profitable, 
but by farmers who had previously adopted hybrid corn, and was thus supportive of the 
idea of “congruence,” that innovation was easier when one has innovated in the past.  The 
sociologists focused more on the observation that diffusion took place too slowly to 
conform to a purely economic model:  
The acceptance of improved farming practices is determined largely by 
economic considerations yet, if economic considerations were the only 
basis of acceptance, improved practices would be adopted as rapidly as 
their economic advantages were demonstrated.  But, not only is there a 
considerable lapse of time between initial acquaintance and adoption of a 
practice, but those who would benefit most from improved practices are   6 
frequently the last to adopt them. [Wilkening, 1953, quoted in Havens and 
Rogers, 1961, p. 410.]   
 
Ultimately, Griliches grudgingly acknowledged the importance of sociological 
factors in diffusion, observing that “If one broadens my ‘profitablity’ approach to allow 
for differences in the amount of information available to different individuals, differences 
in risk preferences, and similar variables, one can bring it as close to the ‘sociological’ 
approach as one would want to.” [Griliches, 1962, p. 330] While Griliches may have 
ultimately rejected the “either/or” approach of the earlier debate, others, such as Schultz 
(1964, p.164, quoted in Dixon, 1980) viewed his work as demonstrating the primacy of 
economic over sociological models in development economics.   
Economic models of diffusion since then have largely remained firmly within the 
context of profitability and relative advantage as the most important factors determining 
the adoption of new technologies, as in the two models developed in Jovanovic and 
Nyarko (1995, 1996) where the relative advantage of the individual agent, for example 
his past investments in specific technologies, determines whether a new technology is 
adopted.  The common feature in these models is the absence of individuals interacting 
with others except indirectly through market forces.  The literature in health economics 
has generally been more sympathetic to the idea of network effect on physician practice 
style (Fournier, Prasard, and Burke, 2002), but even these are often poised in the form of 
individual Bayesian learning models with full (ex post) information.
4  
Exceptions to this approach are Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), where farmers 
learned about their own optimal agricultural inputs by observing what other farmers do 
                                                 
4 See Phelps (2000) for a review of the older literature on diffusion in health care; more 
recently see Coscelli and Shum (2004).   7 
(knowledge spillovers), and Berndt, Pindyck, and Azoulay (2003) which allowed for the 
possibility of network effects in the prescription of anti-ulcer drugs.  More recently, 
Conley and Udry (2004) were able to measure the importance of social networks in 
effecting these knowledge spillovers, finding that pineapple farmers emulated input 
choices of the more successful farmers within their social network.  
The medical quality-improvement movement has largely ignored the economic 
models of adoption and adopted the sociological framework to understand why highly 
cost-effective treatments such as screening for breast cancer, annual flu shots, and the use 
of ￿ Blockers lag behind ideal levels (Berwick, 2003).  In this literature, physicians are 
categorized into groups such as early-adopters and laggards, and the focus is on 
individual “change agents” who can shift treatment norms within hospitals (Berwick, 
2003, see Rogers, 1995).   
Their emphasis on sociological factors is not entirely surprising.  There are few if 
any economic incentives to prescribe ￿ Blockers or flu shots, nor are there obvious 
penalties for neglecting to do so.  Thus standard economic models relying solely on profit 
maximization would have limited predictive power in explaining diffusion (Skinner and 
Staiger, 2005).  What makes the lag in ￿ Blocker adoption puzzling is that the clinical 
benefits have been understood for many years.  In 1985, Yusuf et. al. concluded in their 
abstract that: “Long term beta blockade for perhaps a year or so following discharge after 
an MI is now of proven value, and for many such patients mortality reductions of about 
25% can be achieved.” In 1996 the National Committee for Quality Assurance adopted ￿ 
Blocker use as a marker of quality (Berndt, 2001), yet median state compliance with 
appropriate ￿ Blocker use in 2000/2001 was still just 69 percent (Jencks et al, 2003).  For   8 
the same reason, it would be difficult to develop an economic model explaining why the 
use of X-rays for fractures lagged for several decades in the first part of the 20
th century 
(Howell, 1995), or why more than a century passed between the discovery that lemons 
and limes prevented scurvy to the date when the British Navy mandated their use in 
sailors’ diets (Berwick, 2003). 
Education is an important variable considered by all empirical studies of 
diffusion, but the interpretation of how education matters differs between the economists 
and the sociologists.  For much of the economic literature, education is a measure of 
human capital, and so innovation may be more likely to take place depending on the 
nature of the production function and the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor 
and capital (e.g., Casselli and Coleman, 2004). The sociological literature, on the other 
hand, places greater emphasis on education as affecting the ability of “change agents” 
and early adopters to process and understand the value of the new technology, and to be 
able to make the jump to a new paradigm (Rogers, 1995).  
While one might expect differences across farmers in their education levels to 
affect innovation in hybrid corn, it is more difficult to understand how average education 
levels of the general population would matter for the use of medical procedures, since 
each physician has completed at least 20 years of formal education.
5   Alternatively, 
education might be associated with more rapid innovation if the demand for innovations 
were higher among highly educated patients.  Explaining the pattern of ￿ Blocker use in 
the 24 hours following hospital admission as variations in demand by patients would be 
                                                 
5  Specialists have more formal education, but the correlation between cardiologists per 
capita and ￿ Blocker use across regions is near zero (Skinner, 2003).   
   9 
difficult.  The typical Medicare patient is unlikely to be aware of ￿ Blockers at all, and 
among ideal candidates, its use should have been near 100 percent in any case regardless 
of demand.  An alternative hypothesis is that better quality physicians are attracted to 
regions with higher income and hence greater demand for quality, although we do not 
find evidence for this in the empirical section below.   
The classic work in the diffusion of medical technology is Coleman, Katz, and 
Menzel (1966), who document the diffusion of a new antibiotic, tetracycline, among 
physicians in several North Central communities.  While the diffusion was relatively 
rapid, with nearly 90 percent of physicians using the drug within 17 months, there were 
distinct differences in rates of adoption.  Physicians with more interactions among other 
physicians, such as affiliation with a hospital or group practice, were more likely to adopt 
early.  Importantly, physicians who reported high social participation in the medical 
community adopted earlier.  Among those with low social participation, even after 17 
months the use of the more effective antibiotic lagged by roughly 15 percent (page 49).
6 
This literature suggests an important interaction between regional levels of 
education and the extent of social participation or networks (see Barr, 2000).  The 
pathway is more indirect, since education is highly predictive of social participation in 
the community, participation in democratic activities, and other factors conducive to the 
                                                 
6  More recent analysis of the original data suggest a more complex mechanism for 
diffusion (Strang and Tuma, 1993), with one study finding “contagion” effects 
disappearing after controlling for drug advertising in medical journals  (Van den Bulte 
and Lilien, 2001).  However, since the marketing variable in this latter study is common 
to all physicians in the sample (i.e., it is not adjusted for the number of journals to which 
the physicians subscribe) it is not clear that marketing alone can explain differential 
diffusion rates.  
   10 
interactions that can lead to more rapid diffusion among health care providers within a 
community.
 7    
In practice, we use indexes of social capital and education in the 1990s from 
Braatz and Putnam (1996).  While the idea of social capital has received increasing 
attention in economics (e.g., Helliwell, 1996; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004) 
economists have also been among the most critical; see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) 
for a distinctly lukewarm review of this approach.  Our use of social capital, however, 
avoids their most serious objections, in that we need not identify causality, nor need we 
do more than to establish that some “factor x” associated with high levels of social capital 
(controlling for income) is also associated with technological innovation.   As it turns out, 
general education levels, and even high school graduation rates in 1928 (Goldin and 
Katz, 1998) are highly predictive of these innovations, but reliance upon education alone 
begs the question, as noted above, of why ￿ Blockers were more likely to diffuse in states 
with higher graduation rates.    
We begin the empirical analysis by considering at the state level the association 
among four technological innovations; hybrid corn, tractors, computers, and ￿ Blockers.  
Simple correlations between innovation in hybrid corn and tractors are consistent with 
either economic or sociological models, since the farmers gaining most from hybrid corn 
adoption would presumably enjoy similar gains from adopting tractors.  A correlation 
between hybrid corn and computers is less likely, although to be fair, farmers were early 
                                                 
7  Coleman, Katz, and Menzel (1966, p. 43) also find differences in rates of adoption 
depending on the location of the physician’s medical school, with those attending school 
in the North Central states being more likely to adopt.  See also Strang and Tuma (1993).    11 
adopters of computers to keep track of plot yields and animal medical records.
8  
Predicting a positive correlation between the adoption of ￿ Blockers and the adoption of 
these other technologies is not so obvious, since the educational attainment of physicians 
does not differ much across states, nor is it easy to develop a rational economic model as 
to why physicians wouldn’t adopt highly effective treatments that save lives but only cost 
about 20 cents per dose.   
To develop a broader picture of technology gains in the treatment of heart attacks, 
we also consider risk adjusted one-year mortality rates, and risk-adjusted Medicare 
expenditures by state, whether in levels or in changes during the period of analysis 1989-
2000.  Mortality rates reflect a more general measure of technological innovation that 
goes beyond ￿ blocker adoption.  Since these rates are derived conditional on the index 
AMI, and a variety of covariates are included to control for underlying health differences, 
they are less likely to be confounded by the general health levels of the state.
9 One-year 
Medicare expenditures capture the total value of inputs to care, given that the Medicare 
program effectively pays on the basis of inputs (i.e., procedures performed by the 
physician or subsequent admissions to the hospital) rather than on quality of outcomes.  
                                                 
8   We are grateful to Ernst Berndt for pointing this out.  This pattern is consistent with the 
international data (e.g., Comin and Hobijn, 2004), see also Skinner and Staiger (2005). 
   
9  In other words, Louisiana may have higher rates of heart disease than Vermont, but this 
does not imply that adjusted mortality in Louisiana should be higher conditional on the 
heart attack.  For example, in the empirical section we find no association between 
adjusted AMI mortality and per capita income. 
   12 
Variations in expenditures capture both differences in total inputs across states and over 
time, as well as differences in reimbursement rates.
10  
The obvious question is, why do some states lag behind in adoption of these 
innovations?  Broadly, there are two ways that we might answer this question.  One 
reason is the factors unique to medical care such as regulation, health insurance, or 
malpractice laws.  Alternatively, in some states there may be broad, general barriers to 
technology adoption such as discount rates, risk aversion, lack of human capital and 
information networks, or cultural norms (e.g., Strang and Soule, 1998).  These types of 
barriers would not be unique to medical care, and would imply that some states would be 
late to adopt a wide variety of innovations.  
3.  The Factor Analysis Model  
We adopt a factor analysis approach to quantify the relative importance of state-
level factors that could plausibly be associated with technological diffusion.  The factor 
model assumes that all of the state-level variables are linear combinations of a few 
unobserved factors (representing the state-level characteristics that are barriers to 
adoption) plus an independent error (Harmon, 1967). Thus, the correlations that are 
observed between our different measures of adoption are assumed to be generated by a 
few common factors. Furthermore, we can estimate whether any observed state 
characteristic is strongly correlated with the common factor – i.e., are there 
                                                 
10  There are also marked differences in Medicare reimbursement rates across regions 
because of cost-of-living variation, and more importantly government programs such as 
graduate medical education and disproportionate share hospitals programs.  Thus cross-
sectional comparisons in expenditures will reflect these permanent differences, while 
changes in expenditures will reflect only secular changes in reimbursement rates.    
   13 
characteristics of states that are strongly associated with adoption and can account for the 
common adoption patterns that we observe across technologies.  
  More specifically, a factor model assumes that the data we observe for each state 
(Y) depends on a small-dimensional set of latent factors (F): 
Yj =  Fj ￿ + µj      
where Fj is a 1 x j vector of factors with dimension less than Y, ￿ is a matrix of 
coefficients (the factor loadings) giving the effect of the factors on the elements of Y, and 
µj is a vector of independent residuals with Var(￿) = Y a diagonal matrix.  Without loss 
of generality we normalize the factors to be independent with Var(F) = I, and normalize 
the observed data so that each variable has var(Y) = 1.  Thus, the factor loadings (￿) can 
be interpreted as the increase in Y (in SD units) associated with a one standard deviation 
increase in each factor.  Moreover, with this normalization the factor loadings are equal 
to the correlation between Y and each factor, so that a factor loading near 1 suggests a 
strong association between Y and a given factor. 
  The factor structure implies that E(Y' Y) = Var(Y) = L’L+Y.  Thus, the parameters of 
the factor model (L,Y) can be estimated by fitting the parameters of the factor model to the 
observed covariance matrix.  There are a variety of methods for doing this.  We assume 
normality and estimate the parameters by maximum likelihood (other methods yield similar 
results).  
The main advantage of the factor model is that it summarizes the observed 
correlation in the adoption measures with only a few factors, and thereby focuses 
attention on a few simple dimensions on which adoption varies.  Moreover, if the 
unobserved factors are strongly correlated with other state characteristics such as   14 
education, income or social capital, then the factors can be given a natural interpretation. 
There are also a number of important limitations of the factor model.  First, the estimated 
factor loadings are only unique up to an ortho-normal rotation.  We report estimates from 
the varimax rotation, which is commonly used in factor analysis because it maximizes the 
amount that each outcome is associated with a unique factor, thus helping with 
interpretation of the factors.  A second limitation of the factor model is that the 
appropriate number of factors is not obvious.  We choose the number of factors 
empirically, based on significance of additional factors and the robustness of results. 
4. Data  
  Here we describe each of the state-level variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Measures of Non-Medical Technology Adoption 
We use two state-level measures of technology adoption in agriculture.  For 
hybrid corn adoption, Griliches estimated logistic models for each state of the form 
ln(Pt/(K-Pt)) = a + bt,  where Pt represented the fraction of land planted in hybrid seed in 
year t, K the maximum fraction of land to be planted in hybrid seed, b the parameter that 
captures the speed of adoption, and a the intercept.  The parameters K, a, and b were 
estimated by least squares for each state using annual data on the use of hybrid corn for 
years ranging from 5% to 95% adoption (more precisely, K was first chosen by a crude 
visual method, and then the parameters a and b were estimated by OLS).  We use the 
time (measured relative to 1940) at which the state attained a 10 percent level of hybrid 
corn; this was given by (-2.2-a)/b, and was reported in Table 1 of Griliches (1957) for the 
31 states on which he had data.     15 
  We used an identical methodology to obtain an estimate of the year in which each 
state attained at least 10 percent levels of use for tractors.  Data on the proportion of 
farms in each state using tractors in the years 1920, 1925, 1930, 1940, 1945, 1949, 1954 
and 1959 were taken from Olmstead and Rhode’s (2000) analysis of the diffusion of 
tractors.
11  We assumed that tractors would eventually be adopted by all farms (K = 1), 
and estimated the parameters a and b by OLS for each state.
12  
Finally, using data from the 1993 Current Population Survey, we estimated the 
proportion of the population of each state that had a computer in their home.  Unlike our 
industry-specific measures of adoption in medical care and agriculture, computer 
ownership captured the adoption of a new consumer good in the general population.   
Medicare claims data on treatment of heart attacks 
Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) makes a good case study to use in studying 
health care productivity.  Nearly every AMI patient is admitted to a hospital, and 
ambulance drivers are generally instructed to drive to the nearest hospital, so the match 
between hospital and AMI patient is rarely driven by consumer demand.  The outcome, 
survival, is accurately measured, as are measures of inputs and covariates, whether 
reflecting regional measures in the use of pharmaceutical treatments, or demographic and 
health information (including the type of heart attack).
13 
                                                 
11 The data on tractor use was originally derived from U.S Bureau of the Census (1962, p. 
214).  We thank Paul Rhode for providing these data. 
 
12  Dixon (1980) re-estimated the original Griliches (1957) diffusion parameters to 
account for what ultimately turned out to be a 100 percent adoption level in each state for 
hybrid corn, but found results consistent with the original analysis.   
 
13   Skinner, Staiger, and Fisher (2005) consider in more detail the role of surgical 
innovations in both improvements in outcomes and increasing costs. 
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Data on the mortality and cost of treating heart attacks (acute myocardial 
infarctions, or AMIs) are constructed from the Medicare Claims data from 1989-2000, 
these data are described in greater detail in Skinner and Staiger (2005).  They include 20 
percent of Medicare admissions for 1989 to 1991, and 100 percent from 1992 to 2000.  
We use every fee-for-service heart attack admission to create a longitudinal cohort of 2.5 
million fee-for-service enrollees age 65 or over coded with acute myocardial infarction.
14 
We created risk-adjusted one-year and inflation-adjusted increases in Medicare   
expenditures that control for a variety of demographic factors and comorbidities.
15 Thus 
differences across states and over time in demographic composition, severity of AMI, and 
health status are accounted for in both mortality and expenditure measures.   
We assigned patients to states based on their residence (rather than where they 
were treated), and use linked death certificate data to see whether patients survived a one-
year window.  Payments by Medicare for the initial and all subsequent inpatient (Part A) 
expenditures were used to construct measures of 1-year hospital costs for each patient.  
To construct overall measures of risk-adjusted mortality and costs, we averaged the 
measures for each state across the years 1989-2000.  To construct measures of the change 
in risk-adjusted mortality and costs, we used the change from 1989-1991 to 1999-2000.  
                                                 
14   Luft (2003) found modest differences in underlying measurable health status between 
fee-for-service and the HMO population.   However, the survival characteristics of AMI 
patients in HMOs, conditional on the observed comorbidities in his (and our) data, were 
similar to those in the fee-for-service programs. 
    
15  These include demographic cells by sex, 5-year age groups, and race (black or 
nonblack), and categorical variables for the type of heart attack (anterior, inferior, 
subendocardial, other), the presence of vascular disease, pulmonary disorders, dementia, 
diabetes, liver dysfunction, renal failure, cancer (non metastatic) and cancer (metastatic). 
In this data set, we exclude patients reporting previous heart attacks, but to avoid 
potential secular biases, we did not exclude people appearing twice in the data set.  
.  
   17 
Overall in our data, 35 percent of Medicare heart attack victims died within one year of 
their heart attack, and the average cost of treatment was just under $13,000 in 2000 
dollars. 
Other data on the quality of medical care 
We obtained from Jencks et. al. (2003) additional measures of the quality of 
medical care in 2000/2001 for each state.  These measures were derived by the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from large state-wide random samples of 
medical records.  Jencks et. al. reported information for twenty-two quality indicators for 
each state, ranging from the fraction of the eligible population who receive mammograms 
or flu immunizations, to the proportion of stroke patients who were prescribed a 
recommended medication at discharge.  Thus, these measures were intended to capture 
the extent to which each state had adopted current medical guidelines across a range of 
conditions.   We use the overall ranking (based on the average ranking across the 22 
indicators, with 1 being the best) as a general indicator of how close a state is to the 
frontier in terms of its adoption of medical guidelines.  As a specific measure of 
innovation in the treatment of heart attacks, we also used the percent of heart attack 
patients who receive beta-blockers within 24 hours of admission; as noted above, median 
state-level compliance was just 69 percent. 
State-level factors that may influence the rate of adoption 
In addition to state-level measures of the rate of adoption of various innovations, 
we considered four variables that may capture differences across states that influence the 
rate of adoption.  Since income could affect the demand for innovative products, we 
include per capita income based on the 2000 Census.    Many theories would suggest that   18 
density of the market could influence the rate of innovation, because higher density 
would be associated with greater potential gains from an innovation.  Therefore, we use 
each state’s population density in 2000 (also from the Bureau of the Census).   
The third factor, education, was measured using two different approaches.  The 
first is whether a state invested early in high school education.  As documented in Goldin 
and Katz (1998), the “high school movement” occurred much earlier in certain regions of 
the country, and this early development has had lasting effects on each region.  As an 
indicator of which states were early adopters of high school education, we used the 
number of public and private high school graduates in each state as a percent of the 
number of 17 year olds in 1928.
16  The second education measure relies on an index 
developed by Braatz and Putnam (1996).  The index is the average of (1) test scores from 
the National Assessment of Educational Progress, (2) the average SAT score in the state 
adjusted for participation, and (3) a measure of the high school dropout rate.   
Finally, sociological explanations of technology adoption suggest that measures 
of social capital, which capture the strength of relationships between individuals in the 
state, should be important factors.  We used a social capital index also developed by 
Braatz and Putnam (1996), which is the average z-score of (1) non-profit organizations 
per capita in 1989, (2) newspaper circulation per capita in 1991, (3) voter turnout in the 
presidential elections of 1988 and 1992, (4) the number of association memberships per 
capita from the General Social Survey for the years 1974-1994, and (5) the social trust 
measure from the General Social Survey for 1972-1996. 
5.  Empirical Results  
                                                 
16 See Goldin (1994) for details on the construction of the 1928 high school graduation 
rate. We thank Claudia Goldin and Larry Katz for providing these data.    19 
Summary statistics on the state-level variables are shown in Table 1.  Data are not 
available for all states in all years owing primarily to lack of data on agricultural 
innovations in urban states.  (Alaska and Hawaii are obviously missing for the historical 
data.)  There is a substantial degree of variation in all variables.   
A. Is early adoption related across innovations? 
We begin by comparing the year in which each state adopted hybrid corn and two 
other measures of technology adoption in the state:  the year tractors achieved 10% 
(Figure 1), and the rate of computer ownership in 1993 (Figure 2). There is a close 
association across all three variables with regard to innovation (the graph comparing 
computers and tractors, not reported here, is similar).  The correlation between tractors 
and hybrid corn is not entirely surprising, but it is perhaps more surprising that the pattern 
is so similar in Figures 1 and 2.  One might normally expect a much closer association of 
hybrid corn adoption with tractor adoption than with computer ownership, particularly 
under the assumption that profitability of farm land (rather than general characteristics of 
the state) is a key determinant of agricultural adoption. Iowa might be expected to have 
led in the adoption of hybrid corn and tractors, but it also led in computer ownership.
17 
In Figure 3, we show the relationship by state in the proportion of ideal patients 
receiving b blockers during 2001 (Jencks et al, 2003) along with the year in which each 
state attained at least 10 percent levels of use for hybrid corn varieties, based on the 
logistics curves estimated in Griliches (1957).   Despite more than one-half century that 
separates these adoption measures, and the very sharp differences in the nature of the 
outputs (and the markets for these outputs), states that took longer to adopt hybrid corn 
                                                 
17  As noted above, this could also be explained in part by early adoption of computers by 
farmers in keeping track of livestock.   20 
also had much lower use of b blockers in 2000/2001 (correlation=-0.57).  In other words, 
there appears to be some common state-level factor that lead to slow adoption of any 
innovation, whether in the last century or in this century.      
B. Evidence on the variation in mortality and cost of care for AMI patients 
Cutler and McClellan (2001), Cutler et al. (1998) and Skinner, Fisher and Staiger 
(2005) have documented recent trends in mortality and the cost of care for AMI patients.  
The trends between 1984 and 2000 can be roughly characterized as two distinct periods:  
From 1984 to 1997 there was a steady decline in one-year mortality rates following the 
heart attack, accompanied by a steady rise in costs.  Since 1997, however, costs have 
continued to climb while mortality has remained unchanged or even risen slightly. In a 
previous paper (Skinner, Staiger, and Fisher, 2005), we have demonstrated a lack of 
association between the cost of care and patient mortality; this is shown in Figure 4.  
States such as California and New York spent 40-60% more per patient than states such 
as Indiana and Oregon, yet their patient outcomes were no better (in fact a bit worse).  
The time-series evidence in that previous study showed a similar relationship; no 
association between the growth in expenditures and the decline in mortality.  
This lack of an association between resources being devoted to patients and 
patient outcomes suggests that the variation in mortality is the result of productivity 
differences across regions, i.e. the diffusion of new innovations in the treatment of heart 
attacks has been uneven, with certain states lagging behind.  Figure 5 provides some 
direct evidence suggesting that the high-mortality states have lagged behind in adopting 
effective treatments for heart attacks.  Here we plot the risk-adjusted mortality rate in 
each state (averaged over the entire 1989-2000 period) against the percentage of heart   21 
attack patients receiving b blockers within 24 hours of their heart attack. There is a strong 
negative relationship (correlation – 0.58) between mortality and a state’s use of b 
blockers.  A simple regression of the risk-adjusted mortality rate on the use of b blockers 
suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in b blocker use is associated with a 1.2 
percentage point decline in mortality.  An effect of this magnitude is somewhat larger 
than what would be expected on the basis of clinical trials, given that not every heart 
attack patient is appropriate for the use of ￿ Blockers.  There were many other 
innovations in the treatment of heart attacks; states more likely to use b blockers were 
also more likely to adopt other beneficial innovations in patient treatment.
18 
C. State level factors related to adoption of innovations 
In this section we investigate whether any particular characteristic of a state can 
explain the strong correlations we observe in the adoption of innovations over time and 
across technologies.  Estimates from the factor model are reported in Table 2.  We used 
the factor model to explain fourteen state-level variables: four measures of AMI mortality 
and cost; five other measures of whether the state had adopted various innovations; and 
five state characteristics that might influence the adoption of innovations.  The first two 
columns report the loading for the first two factors – i.e. the correlation between each 
variable and the first two latent factors.  The third column reports an R
2 value, 
representing how much of the variation in each variable can be explained by these two 
factors.  With the exception of changes in cost (and to a lesser extent changes in 
mortality), these two factors are able to explain the majority of the variation across states.  
                                                 
18   This paper does not consider the diffusion of surgical procedures such as angioplasty 
and cardiac bypass surgery.   See Cutler and Huckman (2003) and Skinner and Staiger 
(2005) for further discussion of surgical diffusion.   22 
We limited the model to two factors because the third factor added little to the 
explanatory power for any of the variables.
19 
  These estimates imply that the variation across states in AMI mortality and cost 
can be adequately explained by two quite distinct factors.  The first factor is strongly 
related to mortality, with a correlation of -0.82.  This same factor was also strongly 
associated with all five measures of innovation: the correlation is about 0.7 with all 
positive indicators of adoption (rates of beta blocker use in 2000 and computer ownership 
in 1993); and a correlation of between -0.7 and -0.9 with all negative indicators of 
adoption (quality of care ranking in 2000, and year achieved 10% in hybrid corn and 
tractors).  Moreover, this first factor is correlated 0.97 with the Putnam social capital 
index, correlated 0.95 with the Putnam education index, and correlated 0.80 with the high 
school graduation rate from 1928.  Thus, the first factor suggests that high levels of social 
and human capital in a state are generating early adoption across a wide range of 
innovations.  
  The second factor, in contrast, is only weakly correlated with the measures of 
innovation.  Instead, this factor is closely related to the cost of AMI care, to per capita 
income in 2000, and to the population density in 2000.  Thus, the variation across states 
in the cost of care appears to be associated with very different characteristics of the state. 
                                                 
19 With three factors included, the first factor accounted for 64% of the explained 
variance, the second factor accounted for 28%, and the third factor accounted for only 
8%.  The third factor primarily loaded on to the Jencks overall quality rank and ￿ blocker 
use (but not the AMI measures), explaining a bit more of the variation (and correlation) 
in these two measures but adding little else to the model.  Since ￿ blocker use was a 
component of the Jencks ranking, this third factor may have captured a mechanical 
correlation between these two measures.    23 
  Overall, this factor model suggests that the differences across states in AMI 
mortality and in the adoption of a range of innovations can be explained by a single factor 
that is closely related to the human and social capital of the state that facilitates the 
adoption of innovations.  This can be seen most clearly in the simple two-way graphs that 
show the association between the social capital index and the adoption of hybrid corn 
(Figure 6) and the adoption of ￿ Blockers (Figure 7).   Similar patterns are apparent when 
educational attainment is substituted for social capital.  
More strikingly, Figure 8 plots Putnam’s social capital index against the level of 
risk-adjusted AMI mortality.  Again, this is not a measure of overall health in the 
population (as in Putnam’s (2001) own analysis of social capital and mortality rates), but 
instead the survival rate conditional on an index event and controlling for a wide variety 
of comorbidities, and the result holds even when controlling for differences across states 
in income levels (e.g.., Table 2).  By contrast, there is little association between the level 
of per capita income and mortality rates (Figure 9).  Indeed, there appear to be two 
groups of states, one with a positive association (on the Southwest-Northeast quadrant), 
from Utah to New Jersey and the other with a negative association (on the Northwest-
Southeast quadrant) from Mississippi to Connecticut.  
As noted in Table 2, there is also a strong association between overall 
technological improvements in AMI mortality and social capital.   Figure 10 shows this 
significant negative association between the change in AMI mortality and social capital, 
while Figure 11 displays the lack of association between the change in AMI mortality and 
the level of income in 2000.   Once again, state-level income is shown to have little 
association with technological improvement in health care.      24 
6.  Conclusion   
We have revisited the 1960s debate between Zvi Griliches and the sociologists by 
comparing the adoption of several important innovations during the 20
th century, ranging 
from advances at mid-century in hybrid corn and tractors, to medical innovations in the 
treatment of heart attacks at the end of the century.   We found first a very strong state-
level correlation with regard to the adoption of new and effective technology, and this 
correlation held across a variety of industries and time periods.  These results are 
suggestive of state-level factors associated with barriers to adoption.  One might further 
expect a priori that these barriers could be related to information or network flows, given 
that farmers, physicians, and individual computer users conduct their business in often 
small and isolated groups, and therefore are most vulnerable to potential information 
asymmetries.   
Second, we found that measures of social capital or education appear to explain a 
large fraction of these state-level variations in the diffusion of innovation.  We cannot 
and need not make any claims about causality.   However, it is not unreasonable to 
conjecture that there are systematic differences across states with regard to the frequency 
and likelihood of informational exchanges through networks or other social activities and 
that these are systematically related to both average educational attainment and other 
measures of social capital.   
Finally, we view the debate between Griliches and the sociologists as being a 
particularly useful guide to better understanding what causes technological diffusion. 
Often differences between the economic and sociological view were simply a matter of 
labeling and semantics; what was congruent behavior for the sociologists (i.e., that   25 
farmers who innovate in one technology are more likely to innovate in another) could 
potentially be relabeled Bayesian learning-by-doing by the economists, as in Griliches 
(1962).   But there remain more fundamental disagreements uncovered in this debate.  
For economists, people who innovate first do so because of relative advantage, better 
access to credit, greater profitability, and so forth.  Most economic models assume 
innovation doesn’t occur because it is more profitable to wait, whether because of 
second-mover advantage, risk aversion, credit constraints, uncertainty, or other factors.  
By contrast, sociologists are more interested in why innovation can be so slow 
even when it seems highly appropriate to do so, going so far as to label the non-
innovators “laggards,” a value-laden term economists typically avoid.
20  Both groups 
agree that economic incentives are very important in affecting the likelihood of adoption, 
but the disagreements arise over the behavior of people who are slow to innovate; are 
they slow because they lack (or have rejected) the appropriate decision tools, or because 
they do so optimally?
21   
Despite these caveats, it is important to note the potential importance of economic 
incentives to get around the problem of slow diffusion.  While the evidence is mixed on 
the importance of marketing or drug detailers (Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966; Van 
den Bulte and Lilien, 2001), the fact remains that the drug had largely diffused within 18 
                                                 
20  Economists may be quick to label behavior “inefficient” but this is typically because of 
faulty incentives and not a lack of self-interest.  The growing literature on behavioral 
economics, particularly in health care (e.g., Frank, 2004) holds promise in bridging this 
gap between economists and sociologists. 
 
21 In developing countries, it can sometimes be the case that native people who are 
“laggards” in the adoption of modern agricultural methods do so for very good reasons 
that may not be apparent to the western agricultural advisors (Rogers, 1995).   
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months.  Using more recent data on anti-ulcer drugs, Berndt et. al. (1997) documented 
that detailers both shifted market share and expanded its overall use.  Economic factors 
such as expected profitability are clearly a necessary condition for the adoption of new 
technologies; the insight of the sociologists is that they are not always sufficient 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of State Data 
 
Variable #obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
1. AMI mortality and cost
AMI adjusted 1-year mortality 50 -0.009 0.021 -0.055 0.023
AMI adjusted 1-year ln(cost) 50 9.37 0.19 9.09 9.78
￿mortality, 89-91 to 99-00 50 -0.034 0.020 -0.102 0.031
￿ln(cost), 89-91 to 99-00 50 0.63 0.16 0.42 1.22
2. Measures of innovation
% AMI getting beta blocker w/in 24hr 50 69.7 7.7 50 86
Jencks quality of care ranking, 2000 50 25.8 14.9 1 51
Year hybrid corn achieved 10% 31 1940.6 3.5 1936 1948
Year tractors achieved 10% 48 1930.6 8.7 1916 1947
% with computers at home, 1993 50 0.28 0.07 0.14 0.44
3. Factors that influence adoption
Putnam social capital index 48 0.01 0.79 -1.37 2.11
ln(Per Capita Income, 2000) 50 10.24 0.15 9.95 10.63
Putnam education index 48 0.04 0.83 -1.74 1.89
High School graduation rate, 1928 48 0.30 0.12 0.12 0.55
ln(population density in 2000) 50 4.40 1.42 0.10 7.03  33 
 
 




Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 (1-uniqueness)
1. AMI mortality and cost:
AMI adjusted 1-year mortality -0.82 0.20 0.71
AMI adjusted 1-year ln(cost) 0.00 0.92 0.85
￿mortality, 89-91 to 99-00 -0.52 0.40 0.43
￿ln(cost), 89-91 to 99-00 -0.33 -0.15 0.13
2. Measures of innovation
% AMI getting beta blocker w/in 24hr 0.70 0.20 0.53
Jencks quality of care ranking, 2000 -0.77 0.03 0.59
Year hybrid corn achieved 10% -0.71 -0.27 0.58
Year tractors achieved 10% -0.92 -0.16 0.88
% with computers at home, 1993 0.68 0.45 0.67
3. Factors that influence adoption
Putnam social capital index 0.97 -0.14 0.96
ln(Per Capita Income, 2000) 0.42 0.84 0.88
Putnam education index 0.95 0.05 0.91
High School graduation rate, 1928 0.80 -0.15 0.66
ln(population density in 2000) -0.35 0.89 0.92
Notes: Estimates based on 31 states used in Grilliches (1957). 
           Factor model estimated by maximum likelihood, with varimax rotation
Factor Loadings  34 
Figure 1: Year Hybrid Corn Use Attained 10% and Year Tractor Use 
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Figure 2: Year Hybrid Corn Use Attained 10% and % of Population 
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Figure 3: Year Hybrid Corn Use Attained 10% and Use of Beta 
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Source: Skinner and Staiger (2004) using data from Griliches (1957) and Jencks et. al. 
(2003). 
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Figure 4: Average Risk-Adjusted 1-Year AMI Mortality and Average 
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Figure 5: Use of Beta Blockers Within 24 Hours of Acute Myocardial 
Infarction in 2000/2001 and Average Risk-Adjusted 1-Year AMI 
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Figure 6: Putnam’s Social Capital Index and Year Hybrid Corn 
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Figure 7: Putnam’s Social Capital Index and Use of Beta Blockers 
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Figure 8: Putnam’s Social Capital Index and 
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 Figure 9: Income per Capita in 2000 and 
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Figure 10: Putnam’s Social Capital Index and 
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Figure 11: Income per Capita in 2000 and 
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